The Emerge IRC Decision: Time to Revisit Your IRC Charter and Standing Instructions

November 18, 2026

On November 9, 2026, the Capital Markets Tribunal cleared the three members of Emerge Canada’s Independent Review Committee (IRC) while finding the manager and two of its officers in breach of Ontario securities law. The case is the first time the OSC has brought allegations against individual IRC members; the result should be read closely by every investment fund manager and IRC member in Canada.

Key takeaways

  • An IRC’s duties under National Instrument 81-107 – Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds are triggered by the manager’s referral of a conflict with a proposed action, not by whatever the IRC happens to learn about the fund.

  • The s. 3.9 standard of care applies when members exercise their powers and duties; it is not a general oversight or investor-protection duty.

  • The IRC’s mandate comes from NI 81-107, its charter and securities legislation, so a charter that promises more than the instrument may widen members’ exposure.

  • Managers and IRCs should now review charters, conflict policies and standing instructions, define what a referral is, and keep any extra functions only by deliberate choice.

Background

Between July 2019 and December 2022, Emerge Canada Inc. withdrew more than $10 million from the ARK-branded ETFs and mutual funds it managed, booking the withdrawals as a receivable owed by the manager to the funds (about $5.9 million at December 31, 2022) (para. 52). Much of the money paid the expenses of Emerge Canada and its US affiliate. The funds were wound up in 2023 and the receivable was never repaid.

The OSC brought proceedings against the manager, its CEO, CCO and UDP Lisa Langley, its CFO Desmond Alvares, and the three IRC members, alleging that the IRC failed to make a recommendation (ss. 4.1(1) and 5.3(1)(a)), to disclose the matter in its annual report (s. 4.4(1)) and to meet the standard of care (s. 3.9(1)).

The IRC’s involvement turned on a narrow set of events:

  • In October 2021, at the custodian’s request, Emerge brought the receivable and its “expense absorption practice” to the IRC. Both sides initially called it a conflict referral, and the IRC’s secretariat asked Emerge to complete the referral template in its own conflict manual. Emerge never did (paras. 147–148).

  • At a January 6, 2022, meeting, Emerge said the matter was raised “for informational purposes only” and that it saw no conflict. The IRC identified possible conflicts and asked Emerge to consider a referral; Emerge promised repayment (para. 150).

  • In March 2022, Emerge told the IRC the practice had stopped and the receivable would be repaid by year-end. Instead, it kept growing, and the IRC learned this only in December 2022, after the funds’ auditor resigned (paras. 151–152).

What the Tribunal decided

The panel found every alleged breach proven against Emerge Canada, including its failure to refer the conflicts to the IRC (ss. 5.1(1) and 5.3(1) of NI 81-107). Langley breached her UDP and CCO obligations, and Langley and Alvares were each liable for the manager’s breaches under s. 129.2 of the Securities Act. The panel found no breach by any IRC member. Sanctions will be set at a later hearing, and the merits decision may still be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The key findings on the IRC:

  1. A referral is the trigger, and the manager owns it. The manager must identify the conflict, formulate a proposed action and refer both to the IRC; nothing in NI 81-107 makes it the IRC’s job to identify a conflict or devise a response (paras. 100, 167).

  2. A referral needs a proposed action. The s. 2.4(1) information can arrive over time and no template is legally required, but Emerge’s refusal to use its own template and everyone’s understanding that no referral had been made were relevant (paras. 162–164). An IRC “should not have to guess” at the proposed action (para. 169).

  3. IRC concerns do not create a referral. The panel rejected the OSC’s “substance over form” argument: an IRC’s concerns, information requests and emails labelled “conflict” do not convert a manager’s inaction into a referral (paras. 166, 169).

  4. The s. 3.9 standard of care is tethered to the IRC’s powers and duties. An IRC has no general oversight or investor-protection mandate, and most of its responsibilities are triggered by a referral (paras. 180–183). Nor did the annual report duty extend to unreferred concerns (para. 175).

The panel located the IRC’s limited mandate in NI 81-107, the IRC’s written charter and any other functions securities legislation requires (paras. 166, 181, drawing on Crown Hill Capital Corporation (Re), 2013 ONSEC 32 at para. 164). The charter is the one source that managers and IRCs write themselves.

What NI 81-107 requires

The text of NI 81-107 on charters, referrals and standing instructions is short and was not changed by the amendments in force April 22, 2026.

The commentary adds expectations. Before giving or continuing a standing instruction, the IRC should have reviewed the manager’s policies, requested a report or certification, considered whether a standing instruction suits the fund and set very clear terms and conditions (s. 5.4 commentary 2). A manager and IRC may also agree on additional functions, which the instrument neither prohibits nor regulates (s. 3.6 commentary 4).

Where charters and standing instructions may have drifted

Nearly twenty years after NI 81-107 took effect, many charters and standing instructions have been revised repeatedly, often by adding language rather than removing it. Emerge is a good prompt to check them against the instrument.

The Tribunal tied the s. 3.9 standard of care to the IRC’s “powers and duties” and accepted that the mandate comes partly from the charter, though it did not examine Emerge’s charter or define those powers and duties exhaustively (para. 182). In our view, the charter is the source most likely to widen the mandate, and s. 3.9(2) requires members to comply with it. A charter that describes general “oversight” of the manager, monitoring fund operations or acting in investors’ interests generally could be argued to impose the broad duty the Tribunal found NI 81-107 does not (para. 180). If the charter says the IRC will do something, the IRC may be held to it.

Emerge called its first approach a “conflict referral”, later recast it as “for informational purposes only” (para. 150), and never used its own template. Many firms have similar informal channels: updates to the IRC chair, “heads-up” items, matters tabled for discussion. Where documents do not say what counts as a referral, both sides are exposed to the argument the OSC ran here. A clear process protects them. The Tribunal found no referral partly because Emerge did not use the agreed template, which in effect put s. 2.4(1) into practice, and because the January 6, 2022, transcript showed that no one believed a referral had been made (paras. 163–165). Clear minutes also preserve the good-faith reliance defence in ss. 3.9(3) and (4). Emerge’s assurances to its IRC proved untrue (paras. 151–152), but because the IRC members’ s. 3.9 obligations were not engaged, the Tribunal did not need to consider what steps they should have taken and did not reach that defence (para. 184).

Standing instructions were not at issue in Emerge, but in our view its referral findings apply to them directly. A standing instruction permits the manager to proceed with a proposed action under s. 5.2 or 5.3 on an ongoing basis (s. 1.7), and s. 5.4(1) relieves the manager of the duty to refer only if it “complies with the terms of a standing instruction that is in effect.” Over time, some instructions become broad category approvals with loose conditions, cover activity that has changed, or are rolled over without the review s. 5.4(2) requires. In our view, a manager relying on an instruction that does not clearly cover what it is doing is in the same position as one that never referred the conflict, which Emerge confirms is a breach of ss. 5.1(1) and 5.3(1) for which directors and officers can be held liable (paras. 104, 130, 185).

None of these expansions is necessarily wrong; s. 3.6(2) contemplates agreed extra functions. But every departure from the instrument should be a deliberate choice.

What firms and IRCs should do now

Managers and IRCs should jointly review the charter, the manager’s conflict of interest policy and every standing instruction against NI 81-107, and ask whether each departure is worth keeping.

  1. Map the charter to the instrument. Mark each function as required or additional; s. 3.6(2) requires the charter to describe any additional functions agreed in writing.

  2. Test the language of mandate. For words such as “oversee”, “monitor”, “ensure” and “protect investors”, ask whether the IRC actually does that, and whether members accept the s. 3.9 duty it may carry.

  3. Define a referral. The manager should expressly identify the conflict and state that it is referring it (paras. 167, 169), then provide the s. 2.4(1) information, including its proposed action. A template is not legally required, but the Tribunal found a manager’s failure to use its own template relevant to whether a referral occurred (para. 163). Say how “for information” items are handled, and minute the status of each matter (referral, information only, or awaiting the manager’s decision whether to refer) and any confirmation the manager gives.

  4. Review each standing instruction. Confirm each is tied to a specific action under s. 5.2 or 5.3, has clear conditions, matches current practice and was genuinely reassessed under s. 5.4(2). The IRC must notify the regulator under s. 4.5 if the manager does not comply with a condition of an approval under s. 5.2(1), including a standing instruction (s. 4.5 commentary 1; s. 5.4 commentary 3).

  5. Decide deliberately on each deviation. Record why it exists, who benefits and what risk it creates, and keep it only if both sides would choose it again with Emerge in view.

  6. Consider the manager’s side. Emerge was found to have breached NI 81-107, s. 116 of the Act, the loan prohibition in NI 31-103 and its compliance-system and books-and-records obligations (para. 185), and its UDP misunderstood the purpose of an IRC (para. 129). Training the UDP, CCO and CFO on identifying and referring conflicts matters as much as any charter edit.

Narrowing an IRC’s role to the letter of the instrument reduces members’ exposure, but much of an IRC’s practical value comes from informal engagement. Firms that trim their charters should be clear about what they may lose.

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Next Steps with North Star Group

North Star Group supports registered and regulated firms including mortgage brokers and securities dealers and advisers across the full lifecycle of their business, from incorporation and governance through capital raising, regulatory transactions, and disclosure, with advice that reflects how the business operates today. We would be pleased to help IRCs and fund managers to reconsider their documentation.

Whether you need ad hoc compliance guidance on a securities, AML, or compliance matter, an AML effectiveness review or securities mock audit, ongoing outsourced compliance capacity, or hands-on support remediating your compliance program, our team helps you move forward with clarity and confidence. North Star Legal provides legal support for our clientele.

Reach out to us today at info@northstarcompliance.com.

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About the Authors

Edna Chu (BBA Laurier, LL.B. Windsor, MBA Windsor, J.D. Detroit Mercy) is a Senior Compliance Consultant with North Star Consulting and Counsel with North Star Legal, bringing more than 30 years of legal and compliance experience in Canadian wealth management. Since 2018 as an independent consultant, Edna has advised major Canadian banks, including TD and RBC, on compliance transformation, regulatory implementations and business integrations. She previously served as Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer of Sentry Investments, joining after an OSC enforcement matter began to lead the firm’s move to best-in-class compliance standards. Earlier, she was Vice President and Deputy Head of Wealth Management Compliance at Scotiabank, and led compliance at MD Financial Management and Canada Life. She began her career in corporate and commercial law at Lang Michener LLP (now McMillan LLP) and was later Legal Counsel at TD Bank. Edna is a member of the Embark Independent Review Committee and previously chaired the Independent Review Committees of CST and Harvest Portfolios Group.

Martha Rafuse (B.A. Western, LL.B. Osgoode, LL.M. London School of Economics) is the Head of Compliance at North Star Consulting and a Partner with North Star Legal, bringing more than two and a half decades of securities regulatory experience across the financial industry, private legal practice, and government. Before joining North Star Group, Martha led large compliance teams for both Canadian and U.S. firms, including RBC Phillips, Hager & North Investment Counsel Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc. (Retail), and RBC Royal Mutual Funds. Her earlier experience in big law firm private securities practice led to her experience with the Ontario Securities Commission, where she developed novel legal solutions and led significant policy initiatives.

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This article is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

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